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A

DIALOGUE

ON THE

REVOLUTION;

BETWEEN A

GENTLEMAN

AND A

FARMER.

MANCHESTER:
PRINTED BY C. WHEELER.

M,DCC,LXXXVIII.

A

DIALOGUE

ON THE

REVOLUTION.

F. PRAY, maſter, as I hear a great deal of talk about the REVOLUTION, will you inform me what it means exactly, and why it is mentioned ſo often?

G. Why, friend, the *Revolution* is a name given to an event that took place in *England* exactly *one hundred years ago*, when King James the IId. was compelled to leave the kingdom for miſbehaviour to his ſubjects, and William the IIId. was called in to ſucceed him. The political principles on which this conduct was juſtified, are called *Revolution Principles*; and thoſe who are of opinion that the people have a right to dethrone a King who groſsly abuſes his authority, and violates his truſt, are called *Revolutioniſts*; and ſuch, in fact, are all who can reaſonably pretend to any loyalty towards our preſent ſovereign; whoſe title to the throne is founded on the right of the people to act as they did.

F. I do not well underſtand what right the people had to turn King James out of the kingdom—it was treating him rather like the Servant of the people, than their King.

G. Suppoſe you and I make a bargain, either expreſsly in writing, or it is underſtood between us that certain conditions are mutually to be obſerved; If I break my part of the contract, ſhould you think yourſelf obliged to perform yours?

T. No, certainly; but what contract was there between King James and his people?

G. That contained in *Magna Charta*, and the other known laws of the land; by which certain *duties* were to be performed by the Kings of *England*, whoever they might be, and in conſideration of which, certain *privileges* were allowed them, and obedience enjoined toward them. Certain rights and privileges were alſo expreſsly declared to belong to the Subjects, which were no otherwiſe to be infringed, than in conſequence of the due courſe of law. Thus, the making or enacting of laws belonged to the three eſtates of the realm—the King, Lords, and Commons, conjointly—the executing theſe laws belonged to the King alone, and thoſe whom he ſhould appoint; and it became of courſe the particular duty of the King, to take care that the laws enacted, were properly executed: Again—Magna Charta declares, that no perſon ſhall be turned out of his poſſeſſions, or impriſoned, unleſs by the judgement of his equals, or by the law of the land. This, therefore, was one among the rights of the ſubject; and if the King ſhould either neglect his duty on the one hand, or infringe on the rights of the people on the other, and *continue* ſo to do after due repreſentations were made to him—as he would break his part of the contract towards his ſubjects, they would not be bound to fulfil theirs toward him.

F. This ſeems reaſonable, to be ſure.

G. Nor would the ſame doctrine be unreaſonable, if there were no expreſs or written laws which formed the contract between the King and the people; for it muſt always be underſtood that there are duties to be performed by every King, in return for the obedience paid by his ſubjects.

F. It may be ſo; but I wiſh you would explain yourſelf a little more at large.

G. Do not you think men are happier, living as they do, in large ſocieties or nations, than if they were totally ſeperate, and unconnected, each expoſed to the depredations of another?

F. No doubt they are.

G. What makes them ſo?

F. I ſuppoſe it is becauſe they are bound to aſſiſt one another againſt the violence of any ſtranger; and they are

governed

governed by laws, which ſettle what may, and what may not be done; and thoſe are puniſhed who do wrong.

G. Then the uſe and end of what is called Civil Society, appears to be the ſecurity, comfort, and happineſs of the people who compoſe it; for the laws you ſpeak of tend to that.

F. I ſhould think ſo.

G. But as nobody in particular will do what is the buſineſs of every body, theſe regulations would not anſwer the end, unleſs the management of them were committed to ſome perſons, whoſe particular province it ſhould be, to take care that good laws were made, and properly executed.

F. Certainly.

G. That is, unleſs Kings or Governors, or Chief Magiſtrates were appointed; for you know, the principal perſons in every nation to whom the care of protecting the ſtate, and making and executing laws is committed, are generally known by one or other of thoſe, or ſimilar names.

F. No doubt of it.

G. Then the governors of a nation, whether they are called Kings or Emperors, or Doges or Stadtholders, are for the purpoſe of attaining the ends of civil ſociety, more completely than could be done without them.

F. To be ſure they are.

G. That is, in fact, for the ſecurity, comfort, and happineſs of the whole.

F. So it appears.

G. And if civil ſocieties did not exiſt, there could be no ſuch perſons; for a king, you know, muſt be king over ſomebody—and a governor muſt have ſomebody to govern.

F. Clearly.

G. Then they exiſt in theſe capacities merely in conſequence of civil ſociety.

F. Of courſe.

G. And the titles and honours given to them, and the obedience paid them, are in return for the care they are to take; and to enable them to perform the duties of their ſtation more eaſily, and effectually.

F. So it ſhould ſeem.

G. It

G. It appears, then, that there is in all caſes an implied contract between the governors of a nation, and thoſe who are governed, viz. that the former ſhould promote, to the beſt of their power, the ends of civil ſociety, or the ſecurity and comfort of the people; and theſe, in return, ſhould allow ſuch honours and emoluments as are mutually deemed proper.

F. It does appear ſo to me.

G. But if, inſtead of contributing, the governors ſhould defeat the very end and intention of civil ſociety, and deſtroy, inſtead of promoting the happineſs of the nation, would there be any reaſon to continue the honours and emoluments paid them?

F. Surely not.

G. On the contrary, are they not in fact the *enemies* of the ſtate?

F. Why, indeed, thoſe who defeat the firſt and only object of civil ſociety, cannot be accounted the friends of it.

G. And if ſuch perſons are permitted to proceed in their career, the happineſs of the people muſt be intirely ſubſervient to the intereſts and inclination of iniquitous governors.

F. I ſee plain enough the obvious remedy is to turn them out of their office: but one difficulty occurs to me, and that is, Kings are not elected by the people every time that death occaſions a vacancy, otherwiſe your obſervations would hold indiſputably.

G. That difficulty hardly holds at all with reſpect to our country; where, although every particular monarch is not elected, becauſe we are willing to avoid the evils of an election to a truſt ſo deſirable, yet the *families*, or *ſtocks* from whence the kings ſucceed by heirſhip, are elective, as is well known to every conſtitutional lawyer. But let us ſuppoſe, that in *England*, for inſtance, the king derived his title merely by hereditary right—the *firſt* of the ſucceſſion could not have done ſo: and either every king ſucceeds to the dutiesand privileges of his predeceſſor, or if he arrogates new and extraordinary privileges, it muſt of courſe be with the conſent, expreſs or implied, of the people who are to ſubmit to them; and as the *firſt* would not have enjoyed his title and privileges without the conſent of the people, and in return

return for fulfilling the duties of the office, every other, whoſe title is derived, immediately or remotely, from the *firſt*, muſt of courſe be liable to the ſame terms of the contract; ſo that in all caſes there are duties to be performed on the part of the King, in return for the privileges conceded on the part of the people; and if he fails in the one, tehy are not bound to the other. There are other arguments that might be ſtated, which would put the right of the people to conſult in all caſes the good of the whole, in preference to the intereſt of any individual, beyond all reaſonable doubt.

F. Well; I ſhould like to know ſomething more on this ſubject.

G. I ſhould think that what I have juſt now ſtated, is ſelf-evident. But to be more particular—Do you know how many people the King's dominions may contain?

F. No, indeed; I never heard any thing about the matter.

G. They are computed to have at leaſt ten millions at preſent; and conſidering that America belonged to the crown of *Great Britain* in King *James's* time, the number of his ſubjects could not be much leſs than thoſe of King *George*.

F. It may be ſo, perhaps; but what then?

G. Ought a friend to mankind, think you, to prefer the welfare and happineſs of ten millions of people, and their poſterity, or the private intereſt of one man? In other words (as to the caſe in point) do you think that ten millions of ſubjects were permitted to exiſt, for the ſole gratification of King *James?*

F. Surely not.

G. Then you ſuppoſe, perhaps, that in this, as in all ſimilar caſes, the ends of ſociety, and of good government, would be better anſwered by promoting the happineſs of a great number, rather than of a ſingle individual.

F. No doubt of it.

G. Whether that individual be a king or a ſubject?

F. Why, indeed, I ſhould think ſo, unleſs I could imagine that ten millions of people were permitted to exiſt, as you ſtate it, for the ſole gratification of King *James*, which

which no man of common ſenſe, one would ſuppoſe, could poſſibly imagine.

G. But what if a King ſhould ſacrifice the welfare of his ſubjects, to the gratification of his own pleaſure, vanity, or ambition?

F. He ought to be prevented, if poſſible, by thoſe who are about him: they ſhould certainly be bold enough to tell him, if he does wrong in any great degree.

G. Put the caſe, that he refuſes in all inſtances to adopt or liſten to good advice —— What are you to do then?

F. I ſee no alternative, as a friend to my country or mankind, but to vote for his being depoſed.

G. But to put the general conſideration of the good of mankind out of the queſtion for a moment — Do not you think that you yourſelf are concerned in the welfare of the nation?

F. No doubt of it.

G. And ſo is your family?

F. Certainly.

G. Which do you conceive yourſelf bound to prefer— the welfare and happineſs of yourſelf and your family, or the gratification of an arbitrary monarch?

F. My family, beyond all doubt; and myſelf, of courſe, for their ſakes.

G. Then make the ſuppoſition, that nothing would ſtop the career of deſpotiſm, but the expulſion of the tyrant— What ought you to do — to conſult the permanent happineſs and ſecurity of yourſelf and your poſterity, as well as of ten millions of fellow-citizens, or the temporary and improper gratification of *one* man?

F. But how could I, or any ſingle perſon, do any good?

G. The obſervations we have been making relate juſt as much to every individual among the ſubjects of any monarch whatever, as to yourſelf: you are all mutually bound to protect each other againſt injuries to which you are all liable; and if you knew your duty, and were willing to act up to your knowledge, it would never be difficult to reſiſt the progreſs of arbitrary power.

F. But, though we were all willing, it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe

ſuppoſe that a whole nation ſhould riſe up as one man, at the ſame inſtant.

G. Then you would be under the greater obligation to ſuch individuals as ſhould ſtand in the gap of danger, and ſet ſo good an example to the reſt.

F. No doubt of it; but did King *James* go on in ſuch a manner that the people were compelled to dethrone him?

G. Even if the facts did not remain upon record to ſpeak for themſelves, it could not be credited that ſo rough a remedy ſhould be ſo unanimouſly adopted, if the diſorder would have admitted of milder treatment; eſpecially conſidering the danger to the individuals who firſt preſcribed it: but a ſhort ſummary of the meaſures which that monarch perſiſted in, and which I can ſelect for you, from the hiſtories of the times, will beſt explain the reaſons of his being dethroned.

Immediately on the death of King *Charles* II. *James* called together the Privy Council, to whom he made the following moſt gracious declaration; which, at their command, was publiſhed in the gazette. —— "My Lords; "before I enter upon other buſineſs, I muſt ſay ſomething "to you. Since it hath pleaſed Almighty God to place me "in this ſtation, and I am now to ſucceed to ſo good and "gracious a King, as well as ſo very kind a brother, I "think it is fit to declare to you, that I will endeavour to "follow his example—and, moſt eſpecially, in that of his "great clemency and tenderneſs to his people. I have "been reported to be a man of arbitrary power: but that "is not the only ſtory that has been made of me; and I "ſhall make it my endeavour to preſerve this government, "both in Church and State, as it is now by law eſtabliſhed. "I know the principles of the Church of *England* are for "monarchy; and the members of it have ſhewn themſelves "good and loyal ſubjects; and I ſhall always take care to "defend and ſupport it. I know, too, that the laws of "*England* are ſufficient to make the King as great a monarch "as I can wiſh; and as I ſhall never depart from the juſt "rights and prerogatives of the Crown, ſo I ſhall never "invade any man's property. I have often ventured my "life in defence of the nation, and I will ſtill go as far as

" any man, in preſerving it in all its juſt rights and liber-
" ties."

The firſt act of his reign was to ſeize upon the cuſtoms and exciſe for his own uſe, without the authority of Parliament, although they had been expreſsly given to Charles the IId. for his own life only. Thus he took care to " invade no " man's property."

On the *Sunday* immediately after his acceſſion, he went publickly to maſs—thus did he take care to fulfil his promiſe, " that he would make it his endeavour to preſerve the " government, both in church and ſtate, as by law eſtabliſh-" ed;" and in particular, that "he would always defend " and ſupport the church of *England*." This promiſe he took perpetual care alſo, during every moment of his ſhort reign, to preſerve inviolate, by admitting Papiſts into the Privy Council—by forcing them into the church—by ſending an embaſſador to *Rome*—by publickly receiving the Pope's nuncio—by ſuſpending thoſe of the Clergy who oppoſed the doctrines of the church of *Rome*—by impriſoning in the *Tower* ſeven of the Biſhops who remonſtrated (very humbly) againſt his proceedings—and by innumerable proceedings of a ſimilar nature, all tending to ſubvert the eſtabliſhed religion of the land. Now, though no man ought to be puniſhed merely for being a Papiſt, on the contrary it is a duty incumbent upon him to be one, if upon mature and ſerious conſideration he ſhould ſee reaſon to adopt that perſuaſion, the conduct of *James*, in ſupporting Popery, was unjuſtifiable, as being in direct oppoſition to the known wiſhes of the nation, and to the declared terms on which he began his reign; much more intolerable was his perſecution of proteſtants for being ſo.

How cloſely he followed his brother's example, " eſpe-" cially in his great clemency and tenderneſs towards his " people," will appear from the countenance he gave to the infamous Judge Jefferies, in particular; whoſe path was marked with cruelty and ſlaughter, wherever he went. When this man was ſent out with a commiſſion to try thoſe who had engaged in the Duke of Monmouth's rebellion, his ſavage thirſt of blood was a ſubject of outcry throughout the whole kingdom; but *James*, who had a particular account

of

of Jefferies' proceedings ſent to him every day, took pleaſure in relating to his foreign Miniſters in the Drawing-room, tranſactions which made every one elſe ſhudder, and jeſtingly called them, "Jefferies' Campaign;" and when this monſter of iniquity, having completed his commiſſion, returned in triumph to *London*, he was received as one whom the King delighted to honour; and immediately made a Peer and Lord Chancellor, in conſideration of the many eminent and faithful ſervices rendered by him to the Crown, as well in this reign as the laſt: for ſo it was declared in the gazette.

The clemency and tenderneſs of this monarch was alſo ſhewn very remarkably in the caſe of Mr. Samuel Johnſon: who for writing againſt the Papiſts, and the countenance ſhewn to them, was ordered to be impriſoned, and to be publickly whipped; and when *James* was requeſted to remit the puniſhment of the laſh, he replied, "that ſince Mr. Johnſon had the ſpirit of a martyrdom in him, it was fit he ſhould ſuffer." Johnſon accordingly received 317 laſhes with a cat o'nine tails, for doing what every other honeſt Proteſtant ought to have done.

His regard for "the laws of England, and the rights and liberties of the people," appeared in his claiming and exerciſing a power of diſpenſing at pleaſure with the laws of the land, thereby making himſelf compleatly arbitrary; in his perpetual interfering in elections of every kind; in his overturning the conſtitutions of ſuch corporate bodies as oppoſed in the ſlighteſt degree, the moſt flagrant violation of their rights; ſuch as in the inſtances of the Charter houſe, Magdalen College, &c. and in his perpetual and notorious infringement of the laws, even in the common courts of juſtice, whenever it ſuited his intereſt or his inclination; in retaining thoſe judges only, who would implicitly coincide with his intentions, and impriſoning the reſt; and in his throwing aſide the militia *expreſsly* as uſeleſs, and keeping up a ſtanding army without the authority of Parliament, and contrary to law, for the manifeſt purpoſe of over-awing the nation.

Such are ſome among the perpetual innovations on the rights of the people, which this laſt of a tyrannic family was guilty of—had they occurred now and then only, and had the people, by means of their Parliament, poſſeſſed an opportunity of bringing to condign puniſhment the wicked adviſers

of a miſguided prince, his perſon and his power would have been ſafe; but he was himſelf his own adviſer; he protected delinquency—he puniſhed innocence—he uſed the power entruſted to him, for purpoſes, widely different from the uſes intended, viz. in preparing the chains of abſolute ſlavery for his ſubjects and their poſterity; and we ſhould have had ample reaſon at this day to curſe the ſupineneſs of our foreſathers, if they had permitted the tyrant to remain on his throne.

F. Why really there ſeems to have been reaſon good enough for doing as the people did; but how was it managed; did every body riſe up in arms at once?

G. No; that we have agreed is in every caſe next to impoſſible: it is natural to ſuppoſe that the wiſeſt men would firſt ſee the neceſſity of reſiſtance, and the moſt ſpirited would firſt make it: whether it agreed with the ſentiments of the people at large, would be pretty well aſcertained from the countenance they would afford it—and that a large majority of the nation were decidedly in favour of the meaſures taken, appeared ſufficiently from the remarkable ſucceſs that attended them; nor is it to be expected, that every punctilio of form ſhould be complied with, when the enemy is at the gates, and when compliance in mere matters of form, would materially endanger ſucceſs as to the ſubſtance—but it is evident enough from the hiſtories of the time, that as much regard was had to regularity, and to the principles of the conſtitution in the proceedings againſt James the IId. as the nature of the caſe could poſſibly admit.

F. Well, I am much inclined to your opinion; when fair means will not do us juſtice, force muſt.

G. There is no alternative, if we mean that juſtice ſhould be done—nor can we juſtify our conduct to ourſelves, or to our children, or to our country, or to God, if we tamely ſuffer national injuſtice to be exerciſed with impunity, and purchaſe our own eaſe with the rights of others.

F. There is certainly truth in what you obſerve—but did the nation gain any thing by the change?

G. A great deal; as you will ſee by the declaration of rights, which I will ſhew you; the uſurpations of the crown were conſiderably curbed, and the rights of the people, in thoſe

thoſe inſtances at leaſt wherein James had infringed upon them, were tolerably well defined; ſomething indeed yet remains to be done to prevent the influence of a bad monarch, if ſuch a one ſhould happen to poſſeſs the throne—Open and direct violations of the laws can no longer be attempted, but acts of national oppreſſion and injuſtice may yet be committed, with all the forms of conſtitutional authority, by the exceſſive influence of the Crown in Parliament.—The houſe of Commons, for inſtance, from the *inadequate repreſentation of the people*, ſo far from ſpeaking in all caſes the ſenſe of the majority of the nation, has frequently decided in direct oppoſition to the voice of the people.—Nor was the *duration* of Parliaments ſufficiently aſcertained on the expulſion of James.—They were indeed afterwards ſettled to continue for three years, till that moſt execrable violation of national juſtice was committed in the reign of George Iſt. by a ſet of people calling themſelves *Whigs*, who being elected for *three* years, of their own accord took upon them to continue ſelf-choſen repreſentatives for four years longer. Since then, the Parliament has had what is called a Septennial duration. The evils that ariſe from this inadequate repreſentation of the people, and extended duration of Parliament, every lover of his country cannot but bewail—and a thorough reformation in theſe particulars ſeems at preſent the "one thing needful," in the internal politics of this country—on this ſubject however, you and I may poſſibly have ſome farther diſcourſe.

Nor perhaps were the *religious rights* of the people put upon a proper footing at the Revolution—If a man be a good huſband, a good parent, a good neighbour and a good citizen, it is all that a civil community can require of him—the reſt, that relates to *another world*, cannot with any propriety come under the juriſdiction of the powers of *this*—it muſt be between God and his own conſcience—And can any body doubt but good Huſbands, and Parents, and Neighbours, and Citizens, are to be found of all nations and of all religious perſuaſions? Do not the precepts of every known religion enforce all the eſſential duties of morality? It is therefore highly improper that any man ſhould be puniſhed directly or indirectly, by actual infliction, or negative reſtrictions *here*, for

for that part of his conduct which relates ſolely to *hereafter*. It is moreover puniſhing a man for doing what the laws of God and his own conſcience enjoin him to do—We are "to prove all things, and hold faſt that which is good;" and as no man can *ultimately* judge for another, no man can juſtly be puniſhed for judging for himſelf. Let the civil magiſtrate take proper care of the *actions* of his ſubjects, and their *opinions* he may leave to themſelves.

Some excuſe indeed may be made for the hard laws enacted againſt the Papiſts, at the acceſſion of King *William*, on account of the particular circumſtances of the times; but in the preſent enlightened age, and in this enlightened nation, the continuance of penal laws, and civil reſtrictions, on the ſole ground of religious opinions, is the effect of ſomething very oppoſite to the ſpirit of Chriſtianity.

F. I hope they have not left us much elſe to do.

G. There is at leaſt one other point of material importance yet remaining; for it cannot be ſaid that ſufficient care was taken at the Revolution, to ſecure that great bulwark of the liberties of the people, *the Liberty of the Preſs*: an omiſſion which the legal ingenuity of the preſent day is ſoon likely to make us feel the want of. How are the people to remonſtrate againſt, or to reſiſt undue encroachments of entruſted authority, if they are not permitted to be made acquainted with them? How are they to judge of the merit or demerit of public characters, if their public conduct may not be diſcuſſed? Once ſtop that grand ſource of popular information on political topics, the *Preſs*, and one act of deſpotiſm may preſs upon another, under the dark cover of national ignorance, till the rights of the people are finally overwhelmed.

F. But is the liberty of printing ever likely to be forbidden?

G. No: there is no great danger that a *direct* prohibition will ever be laid upon the diſcuſſion of national ſubjects; but the time may come, when political information will be indirectly ſuppreſſed, by thoſe who dread its influence, but fear to attack it openly.——Thus—Let us ſuppoſe that ſome dangerous attempt on the rights of the people, is meant to be defended on plauſible grounds. The Nation would certainly

tainly be obliged to that man who would "found the trumpet in Iſrael," and open their eyes to the danger of the precedent. A direct prohibition of the publication would not be attempted; but the author might be indicted for a *Libel*, and if a corrupt Judge could perſuade a Jury that *they* were mere judges of the fact, whether the accuſed was the author and publiſher or not, but that the *Court* alone was competent to decide whether the work was publiſhed with a libellous intent, and whether it amounted to a Libel or not—no more would be neceſſary to puniſh ſeverely the benefactor of his country, and reward with the Priſon and the Pillory, the man who deſerved the thanks of the Nation.

F. This is a ſubject worth conſidering, if it be as you ſtate it.

G. And it is ſo. The Liberties of the people then may ultimately be deſtroyed by the coincidence of three circumſtances that have in more inſtances than one already coincided; viz. a corrupt adminiſtration, corrupt Judges, and the perſuaſion among Juries, that they are not, what they really are, judges of the law as well as the fact, in all caſes where theſe are compounded; and univerſally they are ſo in caſes of libel. The moſt important ſtep is nearly accompliſhed at this day: a doctrine is now perpetually echoed from the courts of juſtice of this kingdom, unknown to former days, ſo far as I can find, till the time of *Jefferies*, of notorious memory, "that Juries are *not* judges of the law as well as of the fact"—that they have *no* right to decide from the facts in evidence, in the caſe of libel, what was the *intention* of the author, or what the *tendency* of his work, although they themſelves are of that public to whoſe tribunal every author appeals; and, as one would ſuppoſe, at leaſt, ſufficiently competent from their own feelings, on the hearing or peruſal, to decide on the effect a publication would have on men like themſelves.

F. But how are we to judge of the law, who know nothing about it.

G. The queſtion is not, whether jurymen are accurate lawyers; but whether they, as a part of the public, are competent to judge of that, which was intended expreſsly for the public; namely, the intention of the writer, and the tendency of his performance.—Modern determinations

have

have adopted theſe as queſtions of law, as if nobody could decide from the facts in evidence, of the deſign of the man to whom they are imputed, but a mere technical lawyer.

But in fact, in caſes of far more particular importance, jurymen perpetually decide on the *intention* and *tendency* of an action done.—Thus, I ſtrike a man over the head, he dies in conſequence of it; I am indicted for murder:—is it not material for the jury, before they can bring me in guilty of murder, to collect from the facts in evidence, whether my intention was to hurt the perſon deceaſed? or whatever my intention might be, is it not neceſſary to enquire what was likely to be the effect of a blow ſtruck in that manner; what was the tendency of it? whether if I had no ill intention, I took common and reaſonable precaution to do no material harm? theſe, and ſimilar queſtions, which a Jury would decide upon without ſcruple in a caſe of life and death, go directly to the *intention* of the perſon doing the action, and the *tendency* of the action done. In like manner, there would be no more difficulty in deciding in caſes of libel, what was the intention of the author from the complexion of his work, whether to propagate uſeful information, or ſentiments of ſedition; or whether the work had, or had not, an obvious tendency to injure the peace of ſociety, than on the ſimilar inquiries in caſes of murder.

F. I really do not ſee any more difficulty in the one than the other.

G. Nor, as I ſhould think, any other man of unbiaſſed underſtanding; but having gotten thus far on the road to deſpotiſm, we want nothing but the two coincident circumſtances to be added, of a corrupt adminiſtration and corrupt judges, to make every man of common ſenſe, who has the good of his country at heart, tremble at the event of a conjunction, which will effectually ſhut up from the people their only ſource of political information. At preſent they are not met, and long may they keep ſeperate!

But the time has been, when theſe circumſtances *have* coincided. They did ſo, (for inſtance) when Sir *Samuel Barnardiſton* was indicted for a Libel, (in which he had panegyrized Lord *Ruſſel* and *Algernon Sydney*) before Chief Juſtice *Jefferies*, the favorite of the Tyrant whoſe expulſion I have related.